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1953] REcENT DECISIONS 305 
FuTURE lNTEREsTs-RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs-AcTUAL RATHER THAN 
PossmLE FACTS As DETERMINING CERTAINTY oF VEsTINa--T died testate, 
leaving a life estate to her children A and B, with the remainder to grand-
daughter C. The will further provided that if other body heirs of A and B 
survived their deaths, then such heirs should share equally with C; and if all 
the grandchildren should die without leaving heirs of their body, then the 
property was to pass to T's brothers and sisters or their representatives. A and B 
survived but T died without further issue. Later C also died without issue. X 
held conveyances deeding to him the interests of the estates of A, B, C, and T. 
Suit was brought to determine the rights in the land as between X and the 
representatives of T's brothers and sisters. The trial court transferred the case 
without ruling. The state supreme court held, the gift did not violate the rule 
against perpetuities. The perpetuities issue can be determined on the basis of 
the facts which actually occur, rather than on the basis of those which may 
happen viewed as of the death of the testator. Alternatively, where there are 
two contingencies one of which is bound to happen within the period of the 
rule and the other of which may not, the first may be considered valid. Mer-
chants National Bank 11. Curtis, (N.H. 1953) 97 A. (2d) 207. 
New Hampshire's supreme court is the second1 to demonstrate a willingness 
to deviate from the time-honored rigid application of the rule against perpetui-
ties. The traditional view is that the interest, considered in ·the light of the facts 
existing at the time of the testator's death,2 must vest, if at all, within the period3 
of the rule against perpetuities, or else the contingency is void.4 If there is any 
possible combination of events which could take place that would prevent such 
vesting, the contingency is invalid.5 What may occur rather than what does 
occur is put forth as the common test. 6 It is only in recent years that a tendency 
to deviate from this view has become apparent. In 1947 Pennsylvania enacted 
a major statutory revision7 of the rule against perpetuities, which in effect 
produces the same result as was achieved in the principal case by judicial inter-
pretation. The statute provides: "Upon the expiration of the period allowed by 
1 The first was the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Sears v. Coolidge, 
(Mass. 1952) 108 N.E. (2d) 563. 
2 SIMES, FUTURE lNTERESTs 374 (1951); GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 
4th ed., §231 (1942); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Granger, 51 R.I. 401, 155 A. 
358 (1931). 
s The period extends twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest. SIMES, FUTURE lNTEREsTs 367 (1951); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUI-
TIES, 4th ed., §201 (1942); Industrial Trust Co. v. Flynn, 74 R.I. 396, 60 A. (2d) 851 
(1948). 
4 SIMEs, FUTURE lNTEREsTs 367 (1951); Goffe v. Goffe, 37 R.I. 542, 94 A. 2 (1915). 
5 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §214 (1942); Leach, "Perpetui-
ties in a Nutshell," 51 HA.Rv. L. REv. 638 (1938); Equitable Trust Co. v. McComb, 19 
Del. Ch. 387, 168 A. 203 (1933). 
6 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §214 (1942); Equitable Trust 
Co. v. McComb, note 5 supra; Tiehen v. Hebenstreit, 152 Neb. 753, 42 N.W. (2d) 802 
(1950). 
7Pa. Laws (1947) No. 39, §§4, 5; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §§301.4, 
301.5. 
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the common law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than 
possible events any interest not then vested . . . shall be void."8 This act has 
been attacked because it requires a long waiting period to determine whether 
the vesting will take place9 and during this time the ownership of the property 
is unascertainable.10 But the statute has not been without its supporters, one of 
the most notable being the recent multi-volume treatise, American Law of 
Property.11 The authors assert that the Pennsylvania statute is sound in concept 
and deserves to be widely copied. They declare that the only rationale for the 
generally accepted rule is unrealistic in actual practice. The basis of this 
rationale is that the various persons involved should know from the outset 
which interests are valid and which are invalid, and that such knowledge 
cannot exist when validity depends on events to happen in the future. How-
ever, it is contended that even under the common law rule this uncertainty exists 
because courts refuse to pass on the validity of a remainder until after the life 
estate is terminated. Since validity will not be determined anyway until after 
the uncertain events have taken place, it is argued that the courts should allow 
the testator's intent'-2 to control by taking into consideration whether or not the 
events do in fact take place within the period of the rule. In the past, other 
means have been used in some cases to escape the effect of the rule against 
perpetuities. Where the courts have been able to find an ambiguity in an 
instrument, they have shown a remarkable tendency to adopt the construction 
which makes an interest valid rather than void.13 This is done in spite of the 
often repeated statement that the rule against perpetuities is a rule of substantive 
law, not a rule of construction.14 The principal case goes much farther and 
presents the question of whether the courts will directly and intentionally change 
the rule against perpetuities. Articles written on the subject have shown a 
direct conffict of opinion among scholars in the :6.eld.15 Although it is far too 
early to predict the result, the possible developments are worthy of the close 
attention of any lawyer who ever draws a will. 
Paul B. Campbell, S.Eil. 
8 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.4(b). 
9 48 MICH. L. RBv. 1158 at 1166-1170 (1950). 
10 Phipps, ''The Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities," 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 20 
(1949). . 
11 6 AMERICAN I.Aw oP PRoPERTY §24.21 (1952); also see Bregy, "A Defense of 
Pennsylvania's Statutes on Perpetuities," 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 313 (1950). 
12 New Hampshire has been a leader in giving effect to the testator's intent rather 
than rigidly applying the rule against perpetuities. See, e.g., Wentworth v. Wentworth, 77 
N.H. 400, 92 A. 733 (1914). Gray in his treatise devotes fifteen pages to attacking this 
tendency. GRAY, Tm, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., 752-766 (1942). 
13 S1MBs, FtrroRB INrERBsTs 399-400 (1951); Industrial Trust Co. v. Flynn, note 
3 supra; Colt v. Industrial Trust Co., 50 R.I. 242, 146 A. 857 (1929). 
14 Sn.ms, FtrroRB INrERBsTs 398 (1951); Industrial Trust Co. v. Flynn, note 3 
supra; Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W.Va. 398, 113 S.E. 256 (1922). 
15 Pro: 6 .AMERICAN I.Aw oP REAL PROPERTY §24.21 (1952); Newhall, ''Doctrine of 
the 'Second Look,'" 92 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 13 (1953). Pro and. con: ''Reform of Rule 
against Perpetuities," 92 TRUSTS AND EsTATEs 768 (1953) (Professors Leach and Simes 
and Messrs. Newhall and Looker participating in a panel discussion); also published in 
A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS oP PROBATE AND TRUST I.Aw Dtv:rSioNs 83 (1953). See also Simes, 
''Is the Rule against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doc_trine," supra p. 179. 
